Introduction
examines the decisions made by a set of relatively informed capital market participants around the announcement of a corrective disclosure which gave rise to a class action lawsuit. The capital market participants include financial analysts, institutions, short sellers and insiders. He finds no evidence that financial analysts adjust their forecasts, nor do they drop coverage in anticipation of the corrective disclosure announcement. He does, however, find strong evidence of a revision in forecasts and termination of coverage after the corrective disclosure is announced. In contrast, other informed capital market participants do appear to alter their behavior in the period leading up to the announcement of the corrective disclosure. For example, Griffin finds evidence of increased short selling in the period leading up to the announcement (see also Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996 for a similar finding for the announcement of SEC enforcement actions).
Examining the behaviors of informed capital market participants around a significant "bad news" event is a useful exercise. It allows an assessment of the timelines with which information is impounded into the decisions of these market participants.
Griffin's findings suggest that financial analysts do not provide particularly timely information to the investment community. Analysts appear to wait until the "bad news"
is announced before altering their behavior. The findings for short sellers (and to a lesser extent insiders and institutions) suggest that some informed capital market participants are trading in a manner consistent with the impending "bad news" of the corrective disclosure. These findings corroborate with an extensive literature in finance that has examined the ability for short interest positions to predict future stock price performance (e.g., Figlewski, 1981 , Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan, 2001 and Desai, Thiagarajan, Ramesh, and Balachandran, 2002 .
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows. First, I address the philosophical question: "Does the fact that we observe a large stock price reaction to the announcement of a corrective disclosure mean that no one was trading on the basis of this information?" Second, I discuss in detail the results on how individual capital market participants alter their behavior around the corrective disclosure. Specifically, I outline how financial analysts might not be expected to incorporate this information based on both prior research and what it is that analysts do. Third, I articulate some concerns I have with the empirical analysis on insider trading and show some evidence on a sample of earnings restatements (provided by Min Wu) that suggests the conclusions drawn by Griffin are open to alternative interpretations.
Should we be surprised by finding that informed participants are not very active prior to the corrective disclosure?
The very fact that there is a large market reaction to the announcement of the corrective disclosure is prima facie evidence that capital market participants were unaware of the impending corrective disclosure. So it may not be surprising to find that individual capital market participants (e.g. analysts, institutions, insiders) are not * I would like to thank Paul Griffin, David Larcker, Jim Ohlson, Irem Tuna and Min Wu for comments. unusually active prior to the corrective disclosure. Trading by these informed participants (and the knowledge that an "informed" party was selling) would create downward pressure on the stock, and hence their trading would remove any surprise when the corrective disclosure is announced.
This argument, however, may break down when details of trades made by capital market participants are not immediately known to the market. This is partly true for the participants that Griffin examines. First, short selling behavior is only reported in the aggregate by the exchanges once a month. Second, holdings by institutions are only reported quarterly in filings to the SEC. Third, trading by insiders can be reported with a significant delay. Not all sales by insiders are filed on Form 4 (where the filing has to be within a short period of the sale); some are file on Form 5 (which is only an annual filing requirement). Hence, there is the possibility that certain capital market participants could be active in selling the stock, and the market would not be aware of this until after the corrective disclosure was made. This would explain why, even though informed parties trade on the basis of this information, it is not impounded into price and hence the corrective disclosure comes as a surprise to the market. This reasoning, however, ignores the potential for capital market participants (and market makers) to infer information from volume and order flow. If prices are formed rationally it should be the case that part of the trades by informed capital market participants should be reflected in price. The fact that we see a large stock price reaction to the announcement could be interpreted as evidence that capital market participants were not informed.
Actions of the informed capital market participants
Griffin's analysis of the behavior of analysts, short sellers, insiders and institutions around the announcement of a corrective disclosure could benefit from explicit discussion of the types of decisions that these capital market participants make. A related question is "when should we see activity from the analyst community conveying information to investors?" The typical chain of events involves the firm failing to make correct disclosures and then subsequently being "found out". At this later time a corrective disclosure is made and a class action lawsuit is filed. The average delay between the initial mis-statement and the subsequent corrective disclosure can be quite 1 Griffin only examines a subset of analyst decisions (the issuance of the year ahead forecast and the decision to cover firms). While these may be the most important decisions that an analyst makes they are not the only decisions that an analyst makes. Prior research (Bradshaw, 2002) has documented that analyst recommendations are not consistent with their earnings forecasts. Perhaps information about impending problems may be inferred from a comprehensive analysis of analyst decisions.
lengthy (Griffin finds a mean class action period of 315 days and Wu (2002) finds that the median delay is over 400 days for earnings restatements). Given that analysts are providing information about a firm's prospects on an on-going basis, a truly informative analyst should have conveyed this information to investors at the time of the alleged manipulation. The tests employed by Griffin (2003) examine analyst activity at the time of the corrective disclosure. Even if Griffin were able to find evidence that analysts were revising forecasts downward prior to the corrective disclosure (or were dropping coverage) this would be insufficient evidence to argue that analysts were successfully conveying useful information to investors. Why was this information not communicated to investors closer to the time of the alleged manipulation (almost a year earlier)?
Overall, the results related to analyst forecast errors are not too surprising. We already know from prior research that firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and restatements tend to be firms with high levels of accruals Sweeney, 1996 and Richardson, Tuna and Wu, 2002) . It is also well established that analysts tend to be overly-optimistic for firms with high levels of accruals (Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan, 2001) . Combining these two results, I would ex ante expect analysts to be overly optimistic for firms making corrective disclosures. So it is not surprising to see that analysts fail to downwardly revise earnings forecasts. Analysts only revise their forecasts upon the release of information about the corrective disclosures. That said, however, the analysis by Griffin of analyst behavior around non-routine events, such as the announcement of corrective disclosures, corroborates the findings of prior research which 2 Analysts do trade on their own account. However, the information they use when taking these positions may or may not be the same as the information they use when making an earnings forecast for the next year.
suggest that analysts do not appear to disseminate information to the investment community on a timely basis.
Furthermore, the discussion at the conference highlighted that various types of events could trigger a corrective disclosure. Such events include over-stating revenue or incorrectly capitalizing revenue, in addition to disclosures about off-balance sheet entities and complaints against excessive compensation. It would be useful to see the breakdown of corrective disclosure across various types. I would not expect the response of analysts to be the same for all types of corrective disclosures. Analysts would only incorporate the impact of a corrective disclosure if it related to operating income (the earnings number that analysts forecast). Hence, corrective disclosures related to excessive compensation or non-operating earnings related disclosures (e.g., off balance sheet entities) should not affect the earnings forecasts of analysts unless they are likely to impact operating income within the forecasting period.
3 If the corrective disclosures in the paper are predominantly non-earnings related then this would make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis for financial analysts.
The empirical analysis of short sellers, institutions and insider trading is a more powerful and interesting setting. First, these informed capital market participants stand to directly profit from trading in advance of bad news events such as the announcement of a corrective disclosure (as was pointed out above short sellers, institutions and insiders are placing money on the table as opposed to analyst's who are forecasting earnings or deciding whether to cover a firm). Second, unlike analysts, I do not expect short sellers 3 These corrective disclosures may have information about long run prospects or whether the stock price is likely to rise or fall in the future. However, if they are not expected to impact operating income (this is the number that analysts forecast) in the next 12 months then we should not expect to see analysts altering their or insiders (and to a lesser extent institutions) to be systematically bullish (overoptimistic) with respect to high accrual firms. There is evidence to suggest that insider selling activity is concentrated in high accrual firms (see Table 2 of Beneish and Vargas, 2002 ). There is not much evidence, however, that short sellers concentrate their short positions in high accrual stocks (see Tables 2 and 3 of Richardson, 2003 ). Griffin's analysis of insider trading and short selling activity is consistent with this discussion. He finds evidence that short selling increases prior to the announcement of the corrective disclosure. This confirms the findings of earlier research in Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) for SEC enforcement actions. Griffin also finds evidence that insider selling activity is greater prior to the announcement of the corrective disclosure. Unlike the short selling results the insider trading result is a potentially new result. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) examined the pattern of insider trading activity surrounding the announcement of SEC enforcement actions but were unable to reject the null, probably due to small sample sizes. In the next section, I discuss the insider trading results in more detail as this is a potentially important contribution to the literature.
Comments on the insider trading analysis
Griffin finds that insider selling activity is high in the period leading up to the announcement and falls substantially after the announcement (see Figure 5 in Griffin, 2003) . There is, however, an alternative explanation for the observed pattern. The insider selling activity prior to the announcement is "normal" but that insiders stop selling once the news of the corrective disclosure is made. The observed drop in insider forecasts based on this information. They may, however, alter their longer term forecasts, price targets or recommendations.
selling after the announcement is not necessarily evidence of unusual activity prior to the announcement -it could be a manifestation of unusual activity after the announcement.
The analysis in Figure 5 rests on an assumption that comparing insider trading patterns to periods when there is not a corrective disclosure is an appropriate benchmark for normal insider selling activity. It would be useful to see some more rigorous modeling of expected insider trading activity. insiders trading in a given month. Six insiders sell and four insiders buy. Of the six insiders who sell, five sell 1000 shares and the sixth (the CEO) sells 10,000 shares. Of the four insiders who buy they all buy 500 shares each. Now, if an "insider sell transaction" means that the insider sell metric is an equal weighted combination of the direction of each insiders trade then we would have a value of +2 (6 sellers vs. 4 buyers).
Looking at the values of insider transactions as reported in table 2 the mean (median) value is 4.95 (1.00), it appears as though Griffin is using an equally weighted measure of insider trading. But this is only one of several ways to measure insider trading activity. Issues with insider trading data are not limited to how to aggregate insider trades.
The term "insider" reflects a broad class of investors including directors, officers, affiliates, beneficial owners and a very broad "other" category that includes trustees, 4 Some of my comments on issues with measurement of insider trading are addressed to a certain extent in another paper by Griffin and Grundfest (2002) . They document a significant drop in insider selling activity at the end of class action lawsuit period. They use a variety of measures of insider selling, not just an aggregate of the number of buy and sell trades, and find results are robust across the various measures. If, however, you are interested in how an insider has altered their entire equity portfolio you may also be interested in examining changes in derivative holdings as well.
Analysis of insider trading for an alternate sample: earnings restatements
In this section I examine the insider trading pattern around a large sample of earnings restatements. I use the sample of restatements in Wu (2002) . examine open market sales and purchases of the underlying security (transaction codes "P" and "S" as reported on the database which will typically originate from Form 4 filings). I only include directors and officers as "insiders" (relationship codes of "CB", "D", "DO", "H", "OD", "VC", "AV", "CEO", "CFO", "CI", "CO", "CT", "EVP", "O", "OB", "OP", "OS", "OT", "OX", "P", "S", "SVP", "VP" as reported on the database).
The 642 firm observations generate 1,700 (1,685) firm-month observations in the 12 months leading up to (following) the restatement announcement. The results in table 6 of Griffin are consistent with this interpretation. There is not evidence of an increase in insider selling in the class action period -rather the statistical significance is coming from the drop in insider selling after the announcement of the corrective disclosure. This could be due to informal firm rules prohibiting insiders from trading when the company is facing a class action lawsuit. This is purely conjecture, future research could examine why it is that insider appear to stop selling after "bad news" announcements such as earnings restatements. 5 Griffin compares insider trading activity in the class action period to insider trading activity for the same firm in the period prior to the class action period. This is an alternative approach to modeling "abnormal" insider trading. It is not clear whether the matching approach I adopt (size, industry and time) is more appropriate than the temporal approach used by Griffin. What is clear, however, is that insider trading in the period prior to earnings restatements for the sample that I consider does not appear to be different from non-restating firms.
Conclusion
Griffin tackles an interesting and topical research question. He examines the behavior of informed capital market participants (including analysts, short sellers, insiders and institutions) surrounding the announcement of a corrective disclosure. The focus of the paper is on the response of financial analysts. Given the results in prior research that (i) analysts tend to be overly-optimistic for high accrual firms, and (ii) firms announcing corrective disclosures and earnings restatements tend to be high accrual firms, one may argue that it is not too surprising to find that financial analysts do not convey information to the capital market for these firms. However, I feel that the analysis of analyst behavior around non-routine events such as the announcement of corrective disclosures corroborates the findings of prior research and strengthens the conclusion that analysts do not appear to disseminate information to the investment community on a timely basis.
Griffin also makes a contribution (holding measurement issues aside) in the examination of insider trading and short selling activity in the period leading up to the announcement of the corrective disclosure. These results confirm the concurrent findings in Griffin and Grundfest (2002) that insiders and short sellers are active taking bearish positions prior to the end of class action lawsuit periods.
Future research could continue to examine the activities of informed capital market participants in periods leading up to the announcement of "bad news". If the aim of the research is to examine whether bad news is conveyed differently by various groups of market participants then there is no apparent reason to limit the analysis to the announcement of corrective disclosures. Future work could examine larger samples of bad news information events (such as large stock price declines) to see whether informed capital market participants are revealing information via their trading decisions. The bold line captures net insider selling activity for firms announcing earnings restatements in month zero. The thin solid line reflects a matched sample -for each restating firm I find the firm in the same 2 digit SIC group for the same year with the closest value for total assets.
